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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                                                
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                          No. 01-1706 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                         SPA TIME INC., 
                                 
                                   Appellant 
                                 
                                   v. 
                                 
                BALLY TOTAL FITNESS CORPORATION 
                                 
                                 
                                 
    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
                     DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
                                 
                 (Dist. Court No. 00-cv-03369) 
           District Court Judge: Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
                                 
                                 
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        January 17, 2002 
                                 
Before: ALITO, ROTH, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. 
 
               (Opinion Filed: Februay 1, 2002 ) 
                                 
                                 
                                 
                MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                 
                                 
                                 
PER CURIAM: 
     Spa Time, Inc. ("Spa") appeals from the District Court's grant of 
Bally Total 
Fitness Corporation's ("Bally's") Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a 
claim and from the District Court's subsequent partial denial of Spa's 
motion for 
reconsideration and grant of Bally's converted motion for summary 
judgment.  As the 
parties are well aware of the history of these proceedings and the facts 
involved, we need 
not repeat them here. 
     Spa raises two issues on appeal.  First, Spa argues that Appellee 
Bally breached a 
trade secret covenant by entering into an agreement with Musak Corporation 
("Musak") 
to broadcast in Bally's clubs.  Second, Spa claims that Bally committed 
breach of a 
perpetual contract by entering into a new contract with Musak. 
     We exercise plenary review over a district court's dismissal of a 
complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), see Maio v. Aetna Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d 
Cir. 2000), and 
over a district court's grant of summary judgment, see Farrell v. Planters 
Lifesavers Co., 
206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  In both cases, we apply the same test 
as the district 
court. 
     First, Appellant Spa asserts that the District Court erroneously 
applied the legal 
criteria for the tort of misappropriation of trade secrets because Spa was 
arguing a 
contract claim for breach of a trade secret covenant.  Appellant relies 
heavily on 
Consolidated Boiler Corp. v. Bogue Electric Co., 58 A.2d 759, 141 N.J. Eq. 
550 (N.J. Ch. 
1948), Bolt Associates v. Alpine Geophysical Associates, Inc., 365 F.2d 
742 (3d Cir. 
1966), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), argue 
that disclosure 
is not a required element of a breach of trade secret covenant claim.  Spa 
claims that 
misuse is sufficient for breach of a trade secret covenant and that Bally 
improperly 
misused Spa's trade secret when it contracted with Muzak to provide music 
and 
advertising broadcasting services. 
     We need not reach Spa's analysis of Consolidated, Bolt, and Kewanee, 
and its 
legal conclusion that a trade secret covenant may be breached by either 
disclosure or 
misuse, because Spa fails to allege sufficient facts for either disclosure 
or misuse.  Spa 
does not claim that Bally disclosed its trade secrets, and the only 
allegation of misuse is 
that Bally switched to Muzak to provide its music and advertisement 
broadcasting 
services.  Yet if the trade secret at issue is merely the physical 
machinery and technical 
design of the system itself and its operation, which is what the facts 
indicate, then there is 
no allegation that either Bally or Musak used Spa's trade secret in any 
manner.  Bally and 
Musak could have misused Spa's secret only if we interpret the trade 
secret to encompass 
the very idea of broadcasting music and advertising in health clubs.  This 
interpretation of 
the trade secret, however, is not supported by the record.  Although the 
parties stipulated 
to treat the system and its operation as a trade secret, they did not 
agree to treat the 
concept of a music broadcasting system in a health club as a trade secret.  
Therefore, even 
if Spa is legally correct that it does not have to show disclosure and 
that misuse of a trade 
secret is sufficient to prove breach of covenant, the District Court 
properly dismissed the 
case.  Moreover, although the District Court emphasized that Spa had not 
alleged 
disclosure, it did also observe that Spa had failed to allege misuse.  See 
Distr. Ct. Op. 
(Nov. 14, 2000) at 11, in App. at 11a ("Additionally, Spa has not alleged 
any facts 
showing that secret information was used by Musak or Bally to the 
detriment of Spa.").  
     Second, Spa claims that it entered into a contract of perpetual 
duration with Bally 
and that Bally breached this contract by later entering into an agreement 
with Muzak.  
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the District Court 
correctly determined 
that the parties did not enter into a contract of perpetual duration.  The 
record indicates 
clearly that the parties expected to enter into a national agreement at a 
future date, which 
evidenced an awareness of the limited nature of the parties' continued 
relationship and 
belied any intention for an intermediate agreement to be perpetual.  The 
documents 
reviewed on rehearing also indicated a clear intent that the new agreement 
would be 
temporary.  Therefore, we agree with the District Court's reasoning, 
especially in light of 
the disfavor of perpetual contracts shown by New Jersey courts. 
     In conclusion, the District Court properly found that Appellant Spa 
failed to make 
a prima facie case for breach of a trade secret covenant and to 
demonstrate the existence 
of a perpetual contract.  Accordingly, the District Court's grants of 
Bally's motion to 
dismiss and its converted motion for summary judgment are affirmed.    
 
                                                           
 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
 
     Kindly file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
                                   Circuit Judge
 
